Weekend long read

1) The ITIC provides a portrait of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander killed by Israel this week and initial analysis of Palestinian casualties in the subsequent conflict.

“An initial ITIC examination of the names of ten Palestinians who were killed during IDF attacks revealed the following: six were operatives in the PIJ’s military wing; three were operatives in the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades/Nidal al-Amoudi Brigade (a network that splintered from Fatah) who apparently participated in the rocket fire at Israel; and one was a Fatah operative (it is unclear if he was a military operative).”

2) MEMRI has translated a speech made by a PIJ leader which, predictably, was not reported by the BBC.

“Khader Habib, a member of the leadership of Islamic Jihad in Gaza, said in a November 12, 2019 address that aired on Alghad TV (UAE/Egypt) that Israel will disappear and that Jerusalem and Palestine belong to the Palestinians. He promised that the Jihad against Israel will continue and that the mujahideen will slaughter the Zionists occupying Palestine unless they leave. The statements were made at the funeral of Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Brigades commander Baha Abu Al-Ata, who was killed by the IDF.”

3) The JCPA looks at Iran’s reaction to the killing of Abu al-Ata.

“The PIJ is the Palestinian organization closest to Iran and is heavily dependent on the financial and military aid that Tehran provides. The relationship between the PIJ and Iran is conducted mainly through the headquarters of the organization’s external leadership in Damascus, which holds contacts with the Gazan leadership. Unlike Hamas, which retains political and operational independence, the PIJ is more attentive to Iran’s agenda and to the directives that come from Tehran. The group declared a state of emergency in the wake of al-Ata’s killing.

In recent years, Tehran has supplied the PIJ with rockets, sniper rifles (Iranian-made AM-50 Sayyad-Hunter based on HS.50 rifles that the Austrian Steyr-Mannlicher company sold to the National Iranian Police) , and anti-tank missiles, all the while continuing to train its operatives in Syria and Iran in manufacturing and operating rockets, missiles small arms, and explosive devices (IEDs, EFPs).”

4) At the INSS, Ephraim Kam analyses ‘Iranian Stakes in Syria’.

“Against the backdrop of its military involvement in Syria, Iran has taken a series of steps since 2014 to reinforce its standing in Syria and Lebanon and enhance its military preparedness there, as well as that of its proxies – first and foremost Hezbollah. These steps are of two types. One consists of steps designed to influence Syria’s internal situation and bind it to Iran for the long term, including economic agreements on reconstruction, resettlement of Shiites in Syria, introduction of Iranian religious and cultural values into the country, and establishment of Syrian Shiite militias modelled on Hezbollah in Lebanon. These steps are of great importance to Israel because they entrench and empower Iran’s position close to Israel’s border.”