BBC WS culture show gives the latest mainstreaming platform to BDS

Nearly half of the June 19th edition of the BBC World Service radio programme ‘The Cultural Frontline’ was devoted to the topic of Lebanon’s boycott of the film ‘Wonder Woman’.

“Why has the new Wonder Woman superhero movie been banned from cinemas in Lebanon? We hear about the campaign to boycott the film starring Israeli actress Gal Gadot and speak to political analyst Halim Shebaya in Beirut and Hollywood screenwriter Kamran Pasha in LA, on their arguments for and against the boycott and the ban.”

Presenter Tina Daheley began by telling listeners that:

“The new ‘Wonder Woman’ movie is a global box-office hit but why was it banned in Lebanon?”

Listeners then heard an unidentified voice say:

“It is a non-violent, peaceful way to draw attention to a very important issue.”

The item itself (from 01:18 here) began with Daheley promoting the usual – but inaccurate – BBC mantra according to which the Arab-Israeli conflict has its roots in the events of June 1967. Daheley failed to provide any relevant context concerning the causes of that war.

“…this month marks 50 years since the beginning of the six-day Arab-Israeli war that changed the borders in the Middle East and laid the groundwork for many of today’s issues in the region. The legacy of this decades-old animosity reverberates to this day and affects all aspects of life in the area, including in arts and culture.”

Listeners were told that:

“… just hours before its premiere in Lebanon, the government banned the screening of the movie, citing Gal Gadot’s Israeli background. Lebanon is officially at war with Israel and has a long-standing law in place that boycotts Israeli products and exports. But the last-minute decision by the Lebanese government to ban the film took cinemas by surprise [….] and there’ve been mixed reactions to the ban from audiences in Lebanon.”

Especially in light of Daheley’s introduction to the item, the fact that Lebanon’s law mandating a boycott of Israel was passed twelve years before the Six Day War took place should of course have been clarified, as should the fact that the law applies to more than “Israeli products and exports” and even forbids contact with individuals.  

Listeners then heard four anonymous ‘man in the street’ interviews that were also promoted separately by the BBC on social media.

Daheley next introduced her first interviewee – “Halim Shebaya; a political analyst at the School of Arts and Sciences at the Lebanese American University”.

Shebaya took pains to clarify that he is “not part of the group here that’s calling for the boycott of the movie” but did not clarify what group that is or that its founders include a Hizballah sympathiser. He continued:

“I think given that some pro-Palestinian voices have been calling for a boycott of the movie because of the lead actress’ positions on some issues. Israel has conducted many wars and there have been many civilian casualties in Lebanon and Gal Gadot was reported to have even been serving in the IDF – the Israeli army – during that period. You know, all Israelis have to serve in the army but she’s voiced some explicit public support for the Israeli army’s wars in Palestine [sic] and, I would assume, in Lebanon.”

Listeners were not informed that the 2006 conflict in Lebanon in fact began because the Lebanese terror group Hizballah conducted a cross-border raid and attacked civilian Israeli communities with missiles or that the 2014 conflict in Gaza was sparked by the terror group Hamas’ missile fire on Israeli civilians and construction of cross-border attack tunnels.

The conversation then drifted to the topic of Shebaya’s views on censorship in Lebanon in general before Daheley asked:

“Halim; do you think a cultural boycott can achieve anything?”

Shebaya: “I think it can. Today when we celebrate for example the life of various individuals who took stands in their lives in issues […] to draw attention to some injustices in the world. It is a non-violent, peaceful way to draw attention to a very important issue and whether it’s successful or not will be up for history. I think it has been successful. The boycott campaign has been successful and the end goal is always hopefully to get a peaceful resolution where Israelis and Palestinians and all Arab countries are living in peace; are living in justice. The cultural boycott will make people aware and hopefully spur them to call their governments to pressure all sides into, you know, reach just situation.”

Significantly, Daheley made no effort to challenge that inaccurate representation of the BDS campaign and failed to clarify to listeners that its aim is not ‘peace and justice’ but the eradication of Jewish self-determination in the State of Israel.

Daheley then introduced her second interviewee – ostensibly brought in to give an alternative view of the topic.

“But not everyone supports the boycott. Kamran Pasha is a Pakistani-born Muslim screenwriter, novelist and director living in Hollywood. After facing criticism on social media after writing a positive review of the film, he then posted a statement on Facebook to defend his position. He spoke to us from his home in LA to explain why he wasn’t in favour of a boycott or a ban.”

Pasha’s arguments included the fact that the film is not Israeli-made and that it has a diverse cast and a “positive message of reconciliation”. Listeners were told that:

“In Hollywood […] her [Gal Gadot’s] views are largely very restrained compared to most people that I work with. Most people in Hollywood are passionately pro-Israel.”

Pasha’s main point was not that a boycott is wrong or racist, but that it is ineffective.

“I understand the emotion behind many of the people choosing to boycott ‘Wonder Woman’ because they feel that Gal Gadot’s defence of the IDF  – I believe she posted something on Instagram saying she supported the IDF in its conflict in Gaza. At the same time I do not believe a boycott will be effective.”

Pasha went on to claim that “the best way to help the Palestinian people is for more people who are sympathetic to their position […] to come to Hollywood”, later adding that fighting “for the Palestinian cause […] is what I do here”.

He introduced the unrelated topic of South Africa into the discussion.

“Now we speak of BDS; we speak of the success of how boycotting was effective in South Africa. Many people in the BDS community use that analogy. And in my view BDS did a noble effort for many years that was not particularly effective in the 80s until Hollywood started noticing and then you started having the South African villain […] and right after that there was a seismic shift in public perception about apartheid was happening in South Africa.”

Worldwide listeners to this programme obviously did not hear two opposing opinions on the topic of this latest manifestation of anti-Israel boycotts. What they heard instead was like-minded people debating the technical merits of a boycott campaign (directed at a person solely because of her nationality and ethnicity) rather than its content.

This is of course by no means the first time that the BBC has provided an unchallenged platform for supporters of the anti-Israel, anti-peace BDS campaign without clarification of its real agenda and in the past, BBC audiences have even seen that campaign misrepresented as a ‘human rights’ organisation. Moreover, the BBC claimed in 2015 that it is “not our role” to inform audiences to what the campaigners to whom it regularly gives airtime and column space actually aspire.

And thus – as this latest example once again shows – the BBC continues its policy of mainstreaming an aggressive political campaign that both targets individuals on the basis of their religion and ethnicity and aims to deny the right of self-determination to one particular ethnic group.

Related Articles:

 Omission and inaccuracy in BBC’s ‘Wonder Woman’ Lebanon ban report

BBC’s Connolly misleads on Lebanese boycott law

 

 

 

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Reviewing BBC reporting of Hizballah’s violations of UNSC Resolution 1701

On August 12th 2006 the BBC News website reported that:

“The UN Security Council has unanimously approved a new resolution calling for a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

Resolution 1701 calls for “a full cessation of hostilities”, and UN and Lebanese troops to replace Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.”

BBC audiences were also provided with the text of that UNSC resolution which of course includes the following:1701 text art

“Emphasises the importance of the extension of the control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon;”

The resolution calls for:

  • “security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
  • full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
  • no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
  • no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;”

The same resolution expanded the mandate and capabilities of the UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon and charged it, inter alia, with aiding the Lebanese government to prevent Hizballah’s rearmament.

While that UNSC resolution brought an end to the 2006 war, it has obviously failed to achieve its long-term goal of avoiding the next round of conflict by preventing Hizballah’s rearmament and entrenchment in southern Lebanon.

The BBC’s public purpose remit commits it to keeping its funding public “in touch with what is going on in the world” and to building “a global understanding of international issues” and so it would be reasonable to assume that audiences have been kept up to date on the issues pertaining to implementation of Resolution 1701 throughout the decade since it was adopted – but is that the case?

The ‘timeline’ in the BBC’s online profile of Lebanon (last updated in August 2016) makes no mention at all of the existence of UNSC Resolution 1701.

“2006 July-August – Israel attacks after Hezbollah kidnaps two Israeli soldiers. Civilian casualties are high and the damage to civilian infrastructure wide-ranging in 34-day war. UN peacekeeping force deploys along the southern border, followed by Lebanese army troops for first time in decades.”

The profile itself includes a generalised reference to the disarming of militias without specifically recalling Resolution 1701 and without clarifying the current status of that ‘demand’. 

“The UN has demanded the dismantling of all armed groups in Lebanon, including Palestinian militias and the military wing of Hezbollah, which controls much of southern Lebanon.”

The BBC’s current profile of Hizballah (last updated in March 2016) tells audiences that:

“After Israel withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah resisted pressure to disarm and continued to strengthen its military wing, the Islamic Resistance. In some ways, its capabilities now exceed those of the Lebanese army, its considerable firepower used against Israel in the 2006 war.”

And:

“Hezbollah survived the [2006] war and emerged emboldened. Although it is has since upgraded and expanded its arsenal and recruited scores of new fighters, there has been no major flare-up along the border area, which is now patrolled by UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese army.”

No mention is made of Resolution 1701 and the obligation to disarm the terrorist organisation, prevent its rearmament and remove it from southern Lebanon in either of those profiles currently appearing on the BBC News website.

Immediately after the 2006 war, the BBC was able to tell its audiences that:

“UN Security Council resolutions call for armed militia groups like Hezbollah to disarm.” 

Nearly a year after the adoption of Resolution 1701, the BBC sent Martin Asser to southern Lebanon to ‘examine UNIFIL’s performance’. The caption to the main photograph illustrating his article informed audiences that “Unifil troops are meant to prevent Hezbollah bearing arms”.1701 Asser art

“After the July 2006 war, the [UNIFIL] force received new orders and thousands of reinforcements under the ceasefire resolution 1701, which also stipulated the deployment of the Lebanese army in the area.

Previously the area had become the fiefdom of Hezbollah, the Shia Islamist and militant movement whose cross-border raid on 12 July – snatching two Israeli soldiers – was the catalyst for the 34-day conflict.

The post-conflict objective was for Unifil to help the Lebanese government extend its sovereignty to the southern frontier, so Hezbollah’s armed wing would no longer be free to menace nearby Israeli towns or troops patrolling the border.”

Asser added:

“Hezbollah fighters are masters of concealment and guerrilla warfare – their weapons were never on show before the war, so they are unlikely to be caught red-handed by Unifil or Lebanese troops now.”

An old profile of Hizballah from 2010 states:

“Despite two UN resolutions (1559 passed in 2004, and 1701, which halted the war) calling for disarming of militias in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military arm remains intact.”

In 2013 BBC audiences were told by the corporation’s man in Beirut, Jim Muir, that “Hezbollah has scrupulously observed the ceasefire that ended hostilities in 2006”. In 2015 Orla Guerin reported from south Lebanon but failed to use the opportunity provided by a rare BBC visit to that area to inform audiences of Hizballah’s use of civilian villages to store weapons and as sites from which to launch attacks against Israel.

The BBC has also consistently avoided or downplayed the topic of Iranian breaches of UNSC Resolution 1701 in the form of its transfer of arms to Hizballah. In 2013 BBC audiences heard Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen playing dumb (and some Hizballah spin) on the issue of Syrian transfers of weapons to the terrorist organisation. 

Already in 2007 – just over a year after the war and the resolution which brought it to an end – the UN admitted that Hizballah had “rebuilt and even increased its military capacity” and since then its weapons stocks have vastly increased and diversified. The BBC is of course aware of that fact – as indicated in an article by BBC Monitoring’s Lamia Estatie published on July 11th 2016 under the headline “Hezbollah: Five ways group has changed since 2006 Israel war“.1701 Estatie art

“Its weapons arsenal grew from from [sic] 33,000 rockets and missiles before the 2006 war to an estimated 150,000. Similarly, it swelled from a few thousand members in 2006 to an estimated 20,000-plus.

After 2011, Hezbollah’s military support for the Iran-backed Syrian government – its weapons supply line – gave its fighters considerable combat experience and exposure to Russian military planning.”

No mention of UNSC Resolution 1701 appears in that report either.

It is apparent that as the decade since the UNSC’s adoption of 1701 progressed, BBC audiences saw less coverage of the topic of the existence of the resolution itself and the fact that its terms have been serially violated. Given the obligations to its funding public laid out in the public purposes remit, it is difficult to see how the BBC can justify that pattern of reporting.

Related Articles:

Why BBC audiences won’t understand the next Israel-Hizballah conflict – part one

Why BBC audiences won’t understand the next Israel-Hizballah conflict – part two

 

Weekend long read

1) As regular readers know, internal Palestinian affairs are consistently under-reported by the BBC despite the fact that it has permanent offices in Ramallah and in Gaza City. Khaled Abu Toameh brings news of the upcoming Palestinian municipal elections – of which BBC audiences will not be aware.Weekend Read

“The Palestinian Authority’s recent decision to hold municipal elections on October 8 has sparked fear among Palestinians that the move will lead to even more security chaos and anarchy, especially in the West Bank. The word on the Palestinian street is that the elections will be anything but fair and free.

The decision to hold new elections was taken during a meeting of the Palestinian Authority (PA) government, headed by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, on June 21 in Ramallah. The elections are slated to take place in 407 municipalities — 382 in the West Bank and 25 in the Gaza Strip. […]

Hamas has not yet announced its position on the October 8 municipal elections. The Islamic movement’s leaders in the Gaza Strip said this week that they were still debating amongst themselves, and consulting with other Palestinian factions concerning the local elections.”

(Since that article was published, Hamas has decided that it will participate in the elections.)

2) Daveed Garstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr have written an interesting essay called “The Myth of Lone-Wolf Terrorism” which will ring a bell or two for those getting their news from the BBC.

“Analysts, journalists, and scholars have been quick to label each perpetrator of recent attacks as a lone wolf: individuals who lacked substantial connections to ISIS or other jihadist groups and who carried out their operations without the assistance of others. The designation has generally been applied within 24 hours of these attacks, before significant intelligence about an incident’s planning and execution has emerged—and long before authorities have concluded their investigation.”  

3) The ITIC has produced a report on vehicular terror attacks.

“Israel has been dealing with vehicular attacks since the first intifada (1987), most of them carried out by Palestinian popular terrorism operatives who are not organized or directed by the established terrorist organizations. In most instances the Palestinians use ordinary civilian vehicles, but in some cases they have used heavy construction equipment to increase the number of victims. Vehicular attacks continue to this day: since the beginning of the current terrorist campaign which began in September 2015, of the 224 particularly serious terrorist attacks carried out so far, 31 have been vehicular attacks.”

4) Two US think tanks have this past week held events concerning the Second Lebanon War and the prospect of future conflict between Israel and Hizballah. A podcast of the FDD’s event can be found here and a video is available here. A written report from the FDD on the same topic can be found here.

A video of the event held by the Hudson Institute can be found here.

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part three

As was noted in part two of this post, some of the themes found in BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War a decade ago were also evident eight years later in the corporation’s reporting of a different summer war: the 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas and other assorted terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip.SONY DSC

One of those themes was the presentation of civilian/combatant casualty ratios based on information which was not independently verified by the BBC and as regular readers know, that was a serious issue in the corporation’s reporting of the 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas – and remains so.

“Now on this day last year another war erupted in Gaza. It lasted 51 days and turned into the longest, most costly conflict of the three wars in the past six years. More than 2,100 people were killed in Gaza and 72 were killed on the Israeli side including 66 soldiers. And a very high price paid by civilians – and most of all children – became a defining issue in this confrontation.” (Rebecca Kesby, ‘BBC World Update: Daily Commute’, BBC World Service, 8/7/2015) [emphasis added]

An internet search for information from the BBC concerning casualty figures during the Second Lebanon War produces remarkably uniform results. The BBC’s profile of Hizballah (like additional articles relating to the terrorist group) states that:

“More than 1,125 Lebanese, most of them civilians, died during the 34-day conflict, as well as 119 Israeli soldiers and 45 civilians.”

An article from 2010 informs audiences that:

“More than 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and about 160 Israelis, mostly soldiers, died in the conflict. […] More than 1,000 Lebanese, many civilians, died in the war as well as 116 Israeli soldiers and 43 civilians. In Lebanon, bridges, roads and thousands of homes were destroyed in the Israeli bombardment.”

An article from 2009 tells readers that:

“What it [Hizballah] got was a 34-day onslaught from the Israeli military, costing more than 1,000 lives, mostly Lebanese civilians.

About 160 Israelis were killed, mostly soldiers, in fighting and rocket fire from Hezbollah.” 

Another report from the same year states:

“On the Lebanese side more than 1,000 people died, mostly civilians. About 160 Israelis – most of them soldiers – died in the fighting and rocket fire.”

An article from 2007 states:

“About 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 160 Israelis, mostly soldiers, were killed in the conflict.”

Another report from 2007 tells readers that:

“Most of the 159 Israelis killed were soldiers. More than 1,000 Lebanese, most of them civilians, also died in the 34-day war.”

In a report from November 2006, audiences were told that:

“The war killed more than 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 157 Israelis, mostly soldiers.” 

As can be seen, the BBC’s portrayal of the subject of Lebanese casualties is glaringly and consistently devoid of any mention of Hizballah combatants – despite the fact that at the end of August 2006, the corporation did acknowledge that some of the dead were combatants from that group and others.

2 Leb War Aug Hizb casualties

Like Hamas in 2014, the Lebanese authorities did not differentiate between civilians and combatants during the 2006 war but nevertheless, Lebanese officials reported even before the conflict was over that some 500 of the dead were Hizballah personnel and UN officials gave similar figures while Israeli estimates stand at around 600 (with 450 identified by name: see page 55 here).

As we see above, the media organisation supposedly committed to rigorous standards of accuracy has however continued over the years to portray Lebanese casualties during the 2006 war as “mostly civilians” despite there being no evidence of its having been able to independently verify that claim.

The same is true of the BBC’s portrayal of casualties during the summer 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas which is presented along the following lines:

“The war left more than 2,100 Palestinians dead, the majority civilians, according to the UN.”

In both these conflicts and in others, the BBC adopted and promoted the narrative that non-Israeli casualties were ‘mostly civilians’ despite the lack of independent verification. Moreover, the BBC makes no effort to provide its audiences with information which would enable them to compare civilian/combatant casualty ratios in conflicts in which Israel is involved with those seen in other conflicts.  

The result is of course clear: BBC audiences have over the last decade at least been repeatedly steered towards the erroneous view that wars in which Israel is involved result in exceptionally high numbers of civilian deaths on the other side.   

Related Articles:

BBC continues to avoid independent verification of Gaza casualty ratios

BBC promotion of the inaccurate notion of exceptional civilian casualties in Gaza

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part one

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part two

 

 

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part two

A review of the content produced by the BBC a decade ago at the time of the Second Lebanon War shows that many of the themes found in that coverage resurfaced eight years later in the corporation’s reporting of a different summer war: the 2014 conflict between Israel and Hamas and other assorted terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip.

SONY DSC

One theme found very early on in the BBC’s coverage of the 2014 war was the promotion of the unsubstantiated notion that Israel was committing ‘war crimes’ in the Gaza Strip, based on unverified claims from political NGOs – some of which were already engaged in lawfare against Israel.

Documenting the BBC contribution to political warfare against Israel

Documenting the BBC contribution to political warfare against Israel – part two

Documenting the BBC contribution to political warfare against Israel – part three

After the fighting had ended, the BBC continued to amplify the agenda of NGOs including Human Rights Watch (“More BBC promotion and amplification of lawfare NGO“) and in particular Amnesty International:

BBC’s Middle East editor promotes Amnesty International’s Gaza report

More BBC wind in the sails of NGO’s lawfare campaign

BBC amplification of Amnesty’s lawfare agenda again compromises impartiality

BBC WS ‘Newshour’ amplifies Israel delegitimising lawfare campaign

The green shoots of that editorial policy were apparent – albeit on a smaller scale – eight years earlier when – just eight days into the Second Lebanon War – the BBC News website ran an article headlined “UN warning on Mid-East war crimes” which was based on statements made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time. An additional article published on the same day told BBC audiences that:

“The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, warns that those involved in the spiral of violence between Israel and Lebanon could face war crimes charges if they are found to have deliberately attacked civilians”

On August 23rd 2006 the BBC News website promoted a report by Amnesty International under the headline “Israel accused of war crimes“.

“Amnesty International has accused Israel of committing war crimes by deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure in Lebanon. […]

The document details what it describes as “massive destruction by Israeli forces of whole civilian neighbourhoods and villages”, together with attacks on bridges “in areas of no apparent strategic importance”, on its list of supporting evidence. […]

“Many of the violations identified in our report are war crimes, including indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,” said Ms Gilmore.”

In September 2007 the BBC News website published an article titled “Israel accused over Lebanon war” which amplified a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW).

“A human rights group has accused Israel of carrying out indiscriminate air strikes that killed hundreds of civilians during the 2006 Lebanon war.

Human Rights Watch said Israel showed “reckless indifference” to the fate of civilians and queried its argument that Hezbollah used them as human shields.”

Despite the existence of publicly available evidence discrediting the claims made by AI and HRW (see for example here and here) the above BBC reports (and others) remain available online  – without any clarifying footnote – as ‘historical record’.SONY DSC

Another theme seen in BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War was promotion of the notion of ‘disproportionate’ (and by implication, illegal) actions by Israel – already from day two of the conflict.

“A Lebanese cabinet minister said the Israeli response was disproportionate, and called for a ceasefire. […] France and Russia condemned Israel’s “disproportionate use of force”.” (July 13, 2006)

“The European Union is greatly concerned about the disproportionate use of force by Israel in Lebanon in response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel.” (July 13, 2006)

“President Jacques Chirac of France called Israel’s acts “disproportionate” while Russian President Vladimir Putin called for an end to fighting. […]But he said Israel’s response was “completely disproportionate”, adding: “One can ask oneself whether there isn’t a sort of desire to destroy Lebanon.”” (July 14, 2006)

“Amnesty’s report said Israeli attacks into Lebanon were “indiscriminate and disproportionate”. (November 21, 2006)

Seeing as the BBC did not make any effort at the time (or since) to inform its audiences (and its own staff) of what the principle of proportionality in warfare actually means, it is not surprising to see that the ‘disproportionality’ theme regularly resurfaces in BBC reporting.

In June 2015, for example, viewers of BBC Two’s ‘Newsnight’ saw Evan Davis promote the false notion that proportionality means equality in death and suffering. During the summer 2014 conflict BBC audiences heard and read generous amplification of equally uninformed comment from assorted British politicians and in November 2012 listeners to the BBC World Service heard Julian Marshall tell an Israeli spokesperson:

“I think one of the observations made by critics of Israel is that you always respond disproportionately and – ah – in a way the figures tell the story. Since this offensive of yours began, 39 Palestinians have been killed, three Israelis. There’s a disproportionate use of force going on here.”

In the next instalment of this post we will take a look at additional common themes found in the BBC’s 2006 reporting from Lebanon and its subsequent coverage from the Gaza Strip.

Related Articles:

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part one

 

Why BBC audiences won’t understand the next Israel-Hizballah conflict – part two

As noted in part one of this post the BBC’s correspondent in Beirut, Rami Ruhayem, produced both audio and written reports on the tenth anniversary of the Second Lebanon War on July 12th.

The written report – which appeared in the ‘Features’ section of the BBC News website’s Middle East page – is titled “Ten years on, is Hezbollah prepared for another war with Israel?” and it opened with the use of euphemistic terminology to describe that internationally designated terror organisation and further promotion of the questionable ‘mutual deterrence’ theme found in Ruhayem’s radio report. [emphasis added]Ruhayem written 12 7

“In a region transformed by the wars in Syria and Iraq, the stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah, the Shia jihadist group it last confronted in full-scale warfare in 2006, appears to be one thing that has not changed.

Ten years is the longest period without major fighting between them – a sign, perhaps, that the mutual deterrence established after 2006 is here to stay.”

It went on to amplify unfounded rumour disseminated by a pro-Hizballah Lebanese newspaper.

“But earlier this year, rumour spread in Lebanon that Israel was preparing to attack and finish off Hezbollah, sparking media speculation that the summer of 2016 will see an even bloodier re-run of the war of 2006.”

That was followed by a partial description of the events which sparked the Second Lebanon War in which the missile attacks on Israeli civilian communities that took place together with the infiltration into Israeli sovereign territory were erased.

“Back then, Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers and abducted two in a cross-border raid, and demanded an exchange of prisoners with Israel.”

Ruhayem again presented a picture of Lebanese casualties during that war which – although better than his audio report – failed to provide audiences with accurate information.

“According to official figures, 1,191 people were killed in Lebanon, the majority of them civilians. In Israel, 121 soldiers and 44 civilians were killed.”

As noted previously, Lebanese figures do not differentiate between civilians and combatants but Lebanese officials reported even before the conflict was over that some 500 of the dead were Hizballah combatants and UN officials gave similar figures. Israeli estimates stand at around 600 – more than half of the total Lebanese casualty figures.

Having told readers that “Israel lost and Hezbollah won”, Ruhayem went on to describe the effects of the war in Lebanon but provided no comparative information about the number of people displaced or infrastructure and homes damaged on the other side of the border.

“Up to a million people were displaced, and around 15,000 homes and 900 factories were destroyed, along with roads, bridges, the runway at Beirut International Airport, and other infrastructure.”

As in his audio report, he then went on to describe the ‘Dahiya doctrine’ but without clarifying that the Dahiya neighbourhood of Beirut is Hizballah’s command and control centre.

“Israel laid out a strategy of deterrence, first made public by Maj Gen Gadi Eizenkot in 2008 when he was head of the Israeli army’s Northern Command.

He said that what happened in Dahiya, the southern suburb of Beirut in which neighbourhoods were flattened by Israeli airstrikes in 2006, would “happen in every village from which shots were fired in the direction of Israel”.

Gen Eizenkot, now Israeli chief of staff, articulated what came to be known as the Dahiya Doctrine.

“We will wield disproportionate power,” he said, “and cause immense damage and destruction. This isn’t a suggestion. It’s a plan that has already been authorised.

“Harming the population is the only means of restraining Nasrallah.””

But the most remarkable feature of this article is its problematic presentation of Hizballah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war – once again without any mention being made of Iran’s role in that development.

“From early on in the war, Hezbollah sent its fighters across the border to support President Bashar al-Assad. […]

Their rationale for involvement in support of President Assad has evolved, but a dominant theme is that Syria has been the backbone of the resistance against Israel, and that the attacks on the regime are aimed at undermining Hezbollah by depriving them of an ally that has provided much needed logistical support.

According to their narrative, the war in Syria was a continuation of the 2006 war by other means, with the Americans, Israelis and Saudis trying to finish off the “axis of resistance”, by destroying the glue that holds it together – the Assad regime.”

Ruhayem did not present any challenge to that very transparent Hizballah propaganda or even bother to remind readers that the Syrian civil war began as a popular uprising against the repressive Assad regime and that Israel is not involved in the war in Syria.

In contrast to his audio report, Ruhayem did note Hizballah’s augmented missile arsenal but failed to tell readers where it came from or that it is a clear breach of UN SC resolution 1701.

“There seems to be agreement that Hezbollah has amassed a much larger missile arsenal. Various estimates from both sides suggest they have more than 100,000 missiles, and Hassan Nasrallah insists Israeli missile defence systems are incapable of effectively neutralising them in a new confrontation.”

He yet again whitewashed Hizballah’s origins while promoting a scenario unsupported by any evidence.

“”We are talking about a defensive war, in which we are the ones who are on the receiving end of aggression,” Hassan Nasrallah said.

This reflects Hezbollah’s new posture and priorities. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they kept up a persistent guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, and it was through attrition over almost two decades that they forced them out in 2000.

Some in Israel believe it is better for them to wait and watch than wage war now.

Deputy Chief of Staff and head of the Northern Command Maj Gen Yair Golan said Israel should be in no rush to wage pre-emptive war against Hezbollah.”

It is of course highly unlikely that Israel would do any such thing unless Hizballah took steps which left it no alternative. But if conflict between Israel and Hizballah did break out again, BBC audiences would obviously be seriously lacking the background information crucial to their understanding of that event because reports like these two from Rami Ruhayem fail to provide them with information concerning relevant issues such as the failure of UN SC resolution 1701 to achieve its aims, the rearming of Hizballah and its use of communities in southern Lebanon as human shields and Iran’s patronage of the terror organization which the BBC refuses even to describe in accurate terminology.

One might have perhaps thought that a media organisation that describes itself as “the standard-setter for international journalism” would at some point in the last decade have got round to conducting a serious investigation into why the UN Security Council resolution which ended the 2006 conflict has failed to prevent the conditions being put in place for a third devastating war in Lebanon.

Related Articles:

Why doesn’t the BBC present an accurate picture of Hizballah?

BBC’s Jim Muir whitewashes Hizballah violations of 1701

BBC trumpets Hizballah narrative of ‘resistance’

BBC coverage of STL amplifies Hizballah propaganda

BBC amplifies Hizballah propaganda yet again

Why BBC audiences won’t understand the next Israel-Hizballah conflict – part one

The July 12th edition of the BBC World Service radio programme ‘Newshour’ included an item (from 14:08 here) about the tenth anniversary of the Second Lebanon War which was introduced by presenter Razia Iqbal as follows:Ruhayem Newshour 12 7

“Let’s head to the Middle East now. In a region devastated by wars in Syria and Iraq which have changed things utterly, the enmity between Israel and Hizballah appears to be the one thing that hasn’t shifted. Ten years ago today the two sides fought a 33 day war that cost thousands of lives. The BBC’s Rami Ruhayem reports now from Lebanon, asking what’s changed in the decade since the conflict.”

One answer to the question of what has changed in the last ten years is that Hizballah now possesses an Iranian supplied missile arsenal which is far bigger than the one it had in July 2006 and which threatens many more Israeli civilians. Another answer is that the UN Security Council resolution of August 2006 (1701) which was supposed to prevent (under UNIFIL supervision) Hizballah’s rearmament, its positioning of missiles in southern Lebanon, the resulting use of the population of that region as human shields and to bring an end to Hizballah’s presence south of the Litani river, has shown itself to have resoundingly failed.

” – security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

– full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

– no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; – no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;”

Despite the fact that Rami Ruhayem began his report with an interview with a UNIFIL spokesman, he did not inform BBC audiences of any of the above issues.

“Spanish troops patrol Lebanon’s southern border. They are part of a multinational force that’s been around for decades. It was expanded after the 2006 war.”

Listeners even heard the UNIFIL spokesman make the following claim without any challenge or qualification from Ruhayem:

“The presence of over ten thousand troops coming from 40 different countries; it’s very important for the stability of the south of Lebanon…”

Ruhayem went on to give a partial description of the events which brought about the Second Lebanon war, erasing the Hizballah missile fire on Israeli civilian communities which was carried out at the same time as its infiltration into Israeli sovereign territory.

“But this UN force is not what’s prevented a new war from breaking out. In 2006 after Hizballah killed eight Israeli soldiers and abducted two in a cross-border raid, Israel launched an all-out war on Lebanon and tried – but failed – to destroy Hizballah’s missile arsenal.”

He continued with an inaccurate description of Lebanese casualties.

“Forty-four civilians and 121 soldiers were killed, leaving Israel’s leadership in disarray. Lebanon paid a much heavier price. More than a thousand civilians were killed, about a million displaced, in addition to the lingering misery of cluster bombs dropped by Israel that are still claiming victims.”

The inaccurate claim that the war’s 1,191 Lebanese casualties were all civilians clearly misleads audiences. Lebanese figures do not differentiate between civilians and combatants but Lebanese officials reported even before the conflict was over that some 500 of the dead were Hizballah combatants and UN officials gave similar figures. Israeli estimates stand at around 600 – more than half of the total Lebanese casualty figures. The BBC itself reported in July 2006 that Hizballah had admitted some casualties among its forces.

Ruhayem then went on:

“Ten years on, Dahiya – the southern suburb of Beirut of which large parts were destroyed by Israel – is a busy, bustling part of town. It was swiftly rebuilt with Iranian aid after the war. Its name became part of Israel’s strategy of deterrence: a strategy inspired by Israel’s destruction of Dahiya. It was called the Dahiya doctrine. The doctrine was articulated by Gadi Eizenkot – currently Chief of Staff of the Israeli army. In a now famous quote he said what happened here in Dahiya would happen in every village from which shots were fired in the direction of Israel. ‘We will wield disproportionate power against them and cause immense damage and destruction’.”

Ruhayem however failed to inform his listeners that Dahiya is more than just a “suburb of Beirut”.

“Dahiya is a neighborhood in Beirut which can only be accessed by card-carrying Hizbullah members. During the 2006 war, the IDF bombed large apartment buildings in the neighborhood since they were also used as Hizbullah command-and-control centers, and were built over Hizbullah bunkers.”

He also refrained from providing the rest of that Eizenkot quote:

“What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on,” Eizenkot said in an interview in October 2008. “We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases.” [emphasis added]

A theory (presented as fact) of ‘mutual deterrence’ was pushed by Ruhayem in this report.

“Thus, mutual deterrence set in. Hizballah and Israel were badly hurt each in their own way and deterred from starting another war.”

However, he made no effort to inform audiences of the very relevant differences between a country obliged to defend its citizens from attacks by an internationally designated terrorist organization (and predictably, that terminology does not appear anywhere in this report) based in a neighbouring country and the religiously motivated ideology which drives both Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors.

Those Iranian sponsors were also conspicuously absent from Ruhayem’s description of Hizballah’s entry into the war in Syria – which he presented as just having ‘broken out’ without any mention of Bashar Assad’s brutal attempts to suppress civil protest against his regime.

“But war broke out in Syria and Hizballah sent its fighters to support the Syrian regime.”

Ruhayem also promoted the popular – but inaccurate – BBC theme according to which Hizballah’s origins are to be found in the First Lebanon War.

“The history between Israel and Hizballah dates back further than 2006. A museum set up by Hizballah in southern Lebanon showcases remnants of Israel’s occupation. […] It’s meant to document the part of Hizballah’s war against the Israeli occupation; a war which slowly but surely exhausted the Israelis and drove them out of the south.

Ruhayem closed his report:

“Now Hizballah is pouring fighters into a seemingly endless war in Syria. They now run the risk of attrition in the east and, in the event of war with Israel, onslaught from the south at the same time.”

According to some analysts, that – rather than ‘mutual deterrence’ – is precisely the reason why Hizballah is unlikely to initiate another round of conflict with Israel at this stage. As Avi Issacharoff notes:

“The most important issue in Hezbollah’s decision-making, it is clear, is the situation in Syria and the war against Islamic State. As long as its people are fighting and dying in battle in Syria, it is hard to imagine Nasrallah being dragged once again into another stupid escapade against Israel. He has the ability to bombard every point in Israel with the abundant store of rockets and missiles in his possession. But even he realizes that in the new reality that has been foisted upon him, opening a new front with Israel could lead to his military defeat not only against the Israeli army but also against the radical Sunnis in Syria.”

Like most BBC reports concerning Hizballah, this one too refrained from adequately informing audiences about crucial topics such as the failure of UN SC resolution 1701 to achieve its aims, the Iranian rearming of Hizballah and its placement of missiles in civilian communities in southern Lebanon. And like most BBC reports, this one too fails to clarify to BBC audiences that Hizballah is a terrorist organization which is entirely at the beck and call of Iran.

If the aim of this report was to meet the BBC’s remit of building an “understanding of international issues”, then it has obviously fallen short of the mark. Rami Ruhayem also produced a complimentary written report on the same topic and we shall take a look at that in an upcoming post.

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Visiting BBC journalist provides some refreshing reporting

A BBC correspondent usually based in Mexico City is currently visiting Israel and on July 12th produced two reports – one written and one filmed – relating to the tenth anniversary of the Second Lebanon War.

In her filmed report titled “On patrol with the Israel Defense Forces on Lebanon border” Katy Watson gave viewers a rare view of Hizballah’s use of the residents of southern Lebanon as human shields.Watson filmed

“The soldiers tell me they can see weapons being stored in areas where civilians live.”

That important and usually overlooked information was also available to readers of her written report titled “Israel ‘readier’ for new Hezbollah war“.

“In these stakeouts, troops keep an eye on Hezbollah operatives around the clock. From what they see, the weapons Hezbollah has are being stored in civilian areas.

“Every mission that I’ve been on personally has been observing Hezbollah operations in a heavily populated area,” says one of the soldiers, Gabriel. “In a house with a family living in it or in a house next door or behind it.”

Israel has long said that it will target places where the weapons are stashed. It warns if war breaks out, Lebanese casualties would be high.”

Both reports also include information about Hizballah’s rehabilitation of its missile arsenal since the 2006 war.Watson written

“Hezbollah was damaged, but rebuilt over the past decade with the help of Iran and Syria. Israel says the group’s firepower is now much greater than before the war.

“Now they have more than 120,000 rockets and missiles,” says General Yaakov Amidror, a former national security advisor, now with the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv.

“It’s a huge number that you don’t find in any country in Europe for example. When you see all these efforts, you ask yourself one question – what for?””

While more could have been done to provide audiences with information concerning Iran’s provision of funding and weapons to Hizballah and neither report addresses the fact that Hizballah’s weapons stockpiles are a violation of UNSC resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 war and a clear indication of the impotence of the UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon, these two reports by Katy Watson are nevertheless a refreshing change in the landscape of BBC Israel-related reporting.

It is not every day that we come across a BBC journalist who is content with telling a story rather than telling audiences what to think about a story. 

A retrospective look at BBC coverage of the Second Lebanon War – part one

It was a predictably sunny and warm July morning and I was hanging laundry out to dry on the terrace of my home in northern Israel when, ten years ago today, the sound of unusually intense aircraft activity overhead prompted me to go inside and turn on the radio. Confused reports of missile fire from Lebanon and a cross-border raid in which two Israeli reservists had been kidnapped and several others killed signalled the start of the ensuing thirty-four day conflict – known in Israel as the Second Lebanon War

2nd Lebanon War memorial - Har Adir

2nd Lebanon War memorial – Har Adir

Many of us of course recall exactly how that war began, continued and ended but would a member of the public unfamiliar with the details (perhaps a British student too young to remember) searching online today for information on that topic from the trusted BBC get a realistic, impartial and accurate picture of events?  Over the next few weeks we will be taking an occasional retrospective look at the BBC’s coverage of that war and the information which remains online as “permanent public record“.

The fact that the BBC’s management of online content does not include tagging means that the results of searches are erratic: it is not possible for a member of the public to conveniently find all the relevant content produced by the BBC in one place and in chronological order.

In this post we will look at how BBC content still available online portrays the events which began the conflict: Hizballah’s infiltration into Israeli sovereign territory, its kidnapping of two Israeli reservists and the killing of eight other soldiers in that cross-border raid and the simultaneous missile attacks on Israeli civilian communities by Hizballah.  

One of the first results appearing in a search of the BBC News website is an article from 2008 titled “2006: Lebanon war” which describes those events as follows:

“After eight Israeli soldiers had been killed and two captured by the Lebanese group Hezbollah, Israel and Hezbollah engaged in a 33-day war in which Hezbollah fired a hail of rockets into Israel and the Israelis bombed Lebanese towns, villages and infrastructure but made little headway in ground operations.”

In other words, audiences are not told that Hizballah initiated the conflict by carrying out a cross-border raid into Israeli territory or that it concurrently fired missiles at Israeli civilian communities before any Israeli response took place.

That initial missile fire at Israeli civilian communities is also absent from the portrayal of the beginning of the war found in the BBC’s profile of Hizballah.

“In 2006, Hezbollah militants launched a cross-border attack in which eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two others kidnapped, triggering a massive Israeli response.”

A 2013 profile of Lebanon which is still available online and the 2015 version which supposedly replaced it both similarly ignore that missile fire and fail to inform audiences that Hizballah terrorists infiltrated Israeli territory or that eight soldiers were killed in the initial raid:

“When the Hezbollah militia seized two Israeli soldiers in a raid in July 2006, Israel responded with a 34-day military offensive and a blockade that wrecked post-civil-war stability.”

The timeline accompanying that 2015 profile gives readers no idea of where the Israeli soldiers were when they were kidnapped:

“2006 July-August – Israel attacks after Hezbollah kidnaps two Israeli soldiers. Civilian casualties are high and the damage to civilian infrastructure wide-ranging in 34-day war.”

A backgrounder titled “The Lebanese crisis explained” from 2007 erases both the cross-border raid and the accompanying missile fire from audience view:

“The capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah provoked a month-long Israeli onslaught.”

One might perhaps assume that during July and August 2006, reporting would have been more accurate considering the proximity to the event. Articles from the first day – July 12th 2006 – did indeed give a reasonable account of events, although they failed to describe Hizballah as a terrorist organisation.

“Lebanese guerrillas have captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid, triggering the first Israeli land incursion into the country since 2000. […] On Wednesday morning, Hezbollah launched dozens of Katyusha rockets and mortar bombs at the Israeli town of Shlomi and at Israeli outposts in the Shebaa Farms area.” (July 12, 2006)

Three Israeli troops were killed in Hezbollah’s cross-border raid and four more died in the subsequent offensive. […] On Wednesday morning, Hezbollah launched dozens of Katyusha rockets and mortar bombs at the Israeli town of Shlomi and at Israeli outposts in the Shebaa Farms area.” (July 12, 2006)

“Hezbollah fighters based in southern Lebanon launch Katyusha rockets across the border with Israel, targeting the town of Shlomi and outposts in the Shebaa Farms area.

In a cross-border raid, guerrillas seize two Israeli soldiers before retreating back into Lebanon, insisting on a prisoner exchange and warning against confrontation. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes the capture of the soldiers as “an act of war”.” (“Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis – week one”, July 19, 2006)

However, it was not long before reports appeared which failed to provide readers with the exact details of the event which sparked the war and the fact that Hizballah terrorists had crossed an international border whilst attacking civilian communities with missile fire was not consistently communicated to BBC audiences.   

“Israel is imposing an air and sea blockade on Lebanon as part of a major offensive after two soldiers were seized by the militant group Hezbollah. […] Eight soldiers were killed and two were injured, in addition to the two captured in a Hezbollah ambush.” (July 13, 2006)

“Israel launched its assault and blockade after Hezbollah fighters captured two of its soldiers last Wednesday.” (July 18, 2006)

“Israel launched attacks on Lebanon after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid eight days ago.” (July 20, 2006)

“The nine days of fighting – triggered by the capture of two Israeli soldiers by the militant Hezbollah group in a cross-border raid – have left 29 Israelis dead, including 15 civilians killed by rockets fired by Hezbollah into Israel.” (July 20, 2006)

“More than 380 Lebanese and 42 Israelis have died in nearly two weeks of conflict in Lebanon, which began after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid on 12 July.” (July 26, 2006)

“At least 423 Lebanese and 51 Israelis have died in the violence since Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid on 12 July.” (July 27, 2006)

“A total of 51 Israelis, including at least 18 civilians, have been killed in the conflict, sparked by Hezbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid earlier in July.” (July 30, 2006)

“Humanitarian groups say Israeli military action is hampering efforts to help many of the hundreds of thousands who have fled the fighting – sparked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on 12 July.” (August 7, 2006)

An August 10 2006 report from the BBC’s diplomatic correspondent inaccurately leads readers to believe that Hizballah’s missile fire began after the cross-border raid.

“The IDF’s initial response to the seizure of its two soldiers and the killing of their comrades inside Israeli territory by a Hezbollah unit and the ensuing rocket fire was to launch a punishing air campaign.”

Content produced after the conflict ended is often even less accurate.

A report from southern Lebanon from 2007 ignores the initial missile fire and the killing of eight Israeli soldiers during the initial raid.

“Previously the area had become the fiefdom of Hezbollah, the Shia Islamist and militant movement whose cross-border raid on 12 July – snatching two Israeli soldiers – was the catalyst for the 34-day conflict.”

A 2008 article about a music festival in Lebanon provides readers with no information as to how the war started:

“But in 2006, the festival was cancelled as war broke out between Israeli and the Shia Muslim movement Hezbollah.”

A report from 2009 erases the initial missile fire on Israeli civilian communities:

“The 2006 war was triggered by a Hezbollah raid into Israel, in which the group seized two soldiers and killed others.”

An article from 2014 gives no information concerning the events which sparked the conflict.

“Israel and Hezbollah fought a war in 2006, during which Israeli warplanes bombed Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon and in Beirut, while Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets at Israel.”

Obviously members of the public conducting a search for BBC content in order to understand why the Second Lebanon War began would receive differing impressions depending upon the reports which happened to come up in their search. The BBC’s “permanent public record” is inconsistent, frequently inaccurate and unreliable as a source of factual information.

The least that can be done is for the profiles of Lebanon and Hizballah, which are still in use and to which links are often provided in contemporary reports, to be amended to provide an accurate, impartial and comprehensive view of the actions of Hizballah which brought about the Second Lebanon War.

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Weekend long read

At the Weekly Standard, Willy Stern has a long article about Israel, Hizballah and what the next conflict might look like.Weekend Read

“Hezbollah has a nasty collection of more than 130,000 rockets, missiles, and mortars aimed at Israel. This is a bigger arsenal than all NATO countries (except the United States) combined. Why, a reasonable person might wonder, does Hezbollah need an offensive arsenal bigger than that of all Western Europe?”

The same topic naturally came under discussion at the recent Annual Herzliya Conference and the address given by the IDF’s head of military intelligence was covered by the Jerusalem Post and the Times of Israel.

“Halevy put particular emphasis on the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Israel prepares to mark 10 years since the Second Lebanon War next month.

Hezbollah is believed to have an arsenal of more than 100,000 missiles and rockets, along with weapons systems “that they never had before,” Halevy said.

The intelligence chief wouldn’t say the next round of violence with the Iran-backed terror group would result in mass casualties among Israel’s civilian population, but came close.

“In the Yom Kippur War, we had one person killed on the home front from a Syrian missile. The situation in the next conflict will be completely different,” he said.”

Jonathan Spyer offers some sober reflections on the previous round of conflict between Israel and Hizballah.

“From the perspective of a decade later, however, much of the euphoria of Hizballah and the despair on parts of the Israeli side seem exaggerated.  The results of the war from an Israeli perspective in 2016 are mixed.

The border has indeed been quieter since 2006 than at any time since the late 1960s.  This fact in itself says more about Hizballah’s true assessment following the damage suffered in 2006 than any al-Akhbar editorial excitedly proclaiming divine victory.

And of course Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah himself told a Lebanese TV channel shortly after the war that had the movement known of the scale of the IDF response, Hizballah would have never have carried out the kidnappings which sparked the war.

At the same time, Resolution 1701, which was intended to keep the Shia Islamist movement north of the Litani has failed. Hizballah has built an extensive new infrastructure south of the river since 2006, under the noses of UNIFIL and often with the collusion of the Lebanese Armed Forces.  And Hizballah has vastly increased its rocket and missile capacity.”

At Fathom, Professor Richard Landes discusses anti-Zionism and the ‘global progressive Left’.

“At one point, a contributor to our panel on the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement called that movement ‘anti-Semitic’. The panelist next to me almost jumped out of his skin. Apparently, he found that statement offensive. He was in the wrong room, among those with whom ‘good people’ do not speak.”

Read the whole article here